Showing posts with label versus (series). Show all posts
Showing posts with label versus (series). Show all posts

Thursday, February 11, 2010

Chess & Go

Combine mounds of snow and Chessmaster 9000 – a PC game – and I’ve been getting a bit too into chess.

Growing up I never really got chess. Go – widely considered chess’ Eastern counterpart – caught my attention for some time in college.

In Go, unlike chess, all pieces have equal value and the board begins empty. Players take turn placing pieces on the board, with the goal of capturing territory (and enemy pieces) by surrounding spaces.

The board is a 19 x 19 grid, and each piece is placed on an intersection, which gives you 361 spots for a piece. This accounts for much of its appeal – at the start of the game, the board is overwhelming and abstract, full of possibility. Go is also notorious for giving computer programmers a hard time – its open possibilities make it impossible to program a computer engine comparable to the best Go players.

Nonetheless, beyond the basics, learning Go was deceptively hard, and coupled with a determined friend who was also a beginner, we spent a lot of time making no progress.

Chess, by contrast, has recently struck me as full of personality and intrigue. Pieces take on their own persona, and it’s your job to make them collaborate. Rooks are bulky stabilizers of sorts, while bishops have a strong up-field attack. Both pieces have long-range control, as does the queen – yet her absolute power makes her overly prone to enemy attack. Most aspects of the game I’m still stumped on. Knights in particular have a whimsy movement, which makes them fun to watch until they’re suddenly staring you down.

Yet the strength of each individual piece is conferred mostly by their overall arrangement - their sum inevitably much greater than the total of their parts. In this sense, pawns are like football's offensive (or defensive) linemen - unglamorous and overlooked, yet providing a structure for success.

The fun perhaps comes from going back and forth between attack and analysis. Each move by your opponent requires pause to try to figure out what it accomplishes. Analyzing his potential lines of attack requires an almost Zen-like state of scanning opened lines and spaces. Similar to a geometric proof, the best moves are utilitarian, accomplishing multiple objectives at once. Not unlike life, you need a plan, coupled with knowledge of general principles, and flexibility to respond to the unexpected. You face intriguing interplay between ideas and reality, theory and application.

When stuck it can sometimes help to change your view. It’s not unreasonable to personify the pieces, especially the king – it can help to stand in his shoes and ask what sort of defense he might lobby for. Make no mistake, we're talking about a competition of intellectual prowess which calls for excruciating patience bordering mental torture, not a town-square with Dickensian chatter. But where Go is impenetrably cold and abstract, there is a warm center to chess.

-KJ

_______________

Media (in order of appearance)

Photo: (1)Go Game #2 w/Ramon, 12/23/2005, eshm; (2)Untilted, 12/19/2009, Matthew Bradley; (3)White Knight, 11/31/2009, Mukumbara;
Sphere: Related Content

Friday, June 12, 2009

Honing Capitalism - BAC vs. Fed

Political rhetoric has moved beyond socialism vs. capitalism. Instead, it centers on how to best hone capitalism for the common good. This insight comes directly from Barrack Obama’s autobiography. And in that context, it might just be semantics, replacing the term “socialism” with “honing capitalism for the common good”. The main difference, however, is that people will often have a definitive stance on socialism; but no one quite knows how to hone capitalism for the common good. This is why the Bank of America / Federal Bank scandal has emerged as bar none the most fascinating subplot of the financial collapse.

The basics of the scandal have been unfolding for some time: In September, BAC announced plans to acquire Merrill Lynch (ML). As the crisis worsened in the winter, BAC considered backing out based on ML’s projected 4th quarter losses. Paulson (previous US Treasury Secretary) and Bernanke (current Fed Chairman) pressured BAC to go through with the deal, threatening to withhold bailout should the economy worsen. BAC complied completing the deal around New Years. 2 weeks later, ML announced astronomical quarterly losses of about $20 billion. This outraged BAC shareholders who blamed CEO Ken Lewis, and Lewis in turn blamed Paulson and Bernanke. On top of all this, recently uncovered emails from the Fed show that they applied much more pressure to BAC than was previously thought, going so far as to threaten to remove Lewis. In the meanwhile, BAC, unsurprisingly, has received upwards of $50 billion in bailout funds, along with guarantees of twice that should they face future losses.

Bernanke and Pualson justified their actions as necessary to avoid widescale financial collapse. Afterall the failure of The Bank of the United States catalyzed the Great Depression in 1930. And it is thought that in order to avoid another Great Depression, we must prevent such large scale failures.

There is one view of history that says it’s determined by large-scale historical events. If you could’ve prevented the event, this line of thought goes, you’d have prevented its consequences. A more subtle view sees large historical events as the effect, rather than cause, of underlying social movement. Going by the latter, it doesn’t matter which large scale events you might prevent, because the underlying problem stays the same.

The BAC/ML merger didn't benefit the greater good at BAC's expense. In some ways, it has made the whole system worse. Going into the crisis, BAC was not only the healthiest bank in America, it belonged to a rare breed of successful commercial banks doing business with tens of millions of everyday people. Loading it up with ML's debt was the equivalent of further dragging down our banking system's best fruits with its worst apples. (Ironically, in 1933 the Glass Stegal act attempted to hone capitalism by doing the opposite, forcing the separation of commercial and investment banking.)

The underlying story of the financial crisis is that institutions which were too big to fail misread their risks and were too interconnected to each other. Fair enough. But to the degree that separate institutions are indeed separate, forcing BAC to merge with ML is simply perpetuating the original problem (of interrelated systemic risk) albeit to the nth degree. Instead of cutting our losses with ML and maintaining one great bank, we have a formerly great bank forced to remain on life-support from the government.

Public bewilderment towards the financial crisis stems partly from the fact that no one quite knows what to do. It makes one nostalgic for the 1980’s when things were as simple – at least in retrospect - as Reaganism and Thatcherism vs. Socialsim. Current economic debate - in contrast to the public’s partisan divide on Obama approval ratings - has become less polarized and ideological, more ambiguous and murky, and more important all at the same time. As Greenspan – a self-described Republican-libertarian - pointed out, his job was similar to those of communist central planners, only he was controlling a relatively smaller piece of the economy.

It’s a point worth repeating that the current depression is more complex than most of us can wrap our minds around. And it reveals one of democracy’s flaws, which is that running a country requires more detailed knowledge than is commonly held by the public. Our successful economic recovery - similar to the post-WWII recovery following the Great Depression - is likely to leave the public with few lasting insights about the economy or how the world works. It’s in this panicked context that we see such strange behavior as the Fed’s pressure to force the BAC/ML merger – a scandal occurring at the main nerve of the crisis, the lasting effects of which are unlikely to be well known by the public and experts alike.

What makes this scandal unique is that it's not quite a financial one, and it is a political scandal but not in the regular sense. What, in the end, did Paulson and Bernanke have to gain by forcing the merger? It wasn't money, votes, or even popularity. It didn't spark public outrage like the Madoff or AIG bonus scandals. And the perpetrators weren't guided by partisan or ideological grounds as in the case of Acorn's voter fraud. Unlike any of the previous examples, the perpetrators' motives are not immediately obvious; you have to sit back and think about it before understanding why Paulson and Bernanke felt the need pressure BAC into the merger. And you also have to sit back and think about it before understanding why Paulson and Bernanke's actions were wrong.

-KJ

_______________

Media (in order of appearance)

Photo: (1)Obama at the Texas book festival, 10/28/2006, by Mr. Wright; (2)Bank of America Logo, 08/19/2007, by Neubie; (3)fail, 09/29/2008, by rin3y; (4)Joan of Arc, 08/23/2006, by dbking;(5)Aghast, 08/28/2008, by Daveness98. Sphere: Related Content

Friday, January 30, 2009

Starbucks vs. Harley Davidson: What you see and what you don't

We live in a consumer-driven economy, liberals often say, and how much more can we produce until we’re too chock-full of gadgets and gizmos? This concern is easily manifested in a company like Starbucks: How can they grow when they’re already located on every street corner in every city? Such concerns, like so many misunderstandings about the economy, come back to Henry Hazlitt’s single lesson about economics: What you don’t see is often more important than what you see. We’ll begin by talking about what we see, which is too many Starbucks stores.

What you See

Starbucks originally hooked me on coffee. I was in 8th grade and a location next to my school was giving out samples of their new Frapuccino with brownie bits. Since around that time, Starbucks expanded to over 16,000 locations worldwide. Its horizons seemed endless, as numerous books popped up about the genius idea behind the business, no doubt perhaps conceived in the cozy intellectual confines of the coffee shop’s atmosphere.

But in 2006, way before our current recession, it was clear that Starbucks had over-expanded itself. Since then, it’s closed over almost 1,000 stores and has plans to close hundreds more. In the meanwhile, Starbucks has certainly lost its edge. The issue seems simple enough, and the conversation almost one-dimensional: They need to open more stores. More stores means more money. But the economy - maybe even the world - isn’t big enough. They can only open so many stores in the same city before there’s no room left to expand. Companies rely on growth. What are they to do? In the meanwhile, they’re worried that the Starbucks brand has become stale and too expensive for a society in recession.

What you Don't

The solution to the path that Starbucks should have taken struck me while I was reading about The Harley Davidson Company in Motley Fool’s recent book, Million Dollar Portfolio. The following quote summarizes a bit of the history of Harley Davidson before getting into their success:
In 1901, a 21-year-old William Harley designed a motor to put onto a bicycle. He was soon joined by his good friend Arthur Davidson, and together they started a company that would eventually build motorcycles. Over the next 70 years, the company was private, surviving the ups and downs of the American economy, with major contributions to the war efforts of both World I and World War II. By the 1950’s and 1960’s, though, the company saw its reputation diminished, as it was associated with the Hell’s Angels and other less savory characters.

In 1967, the company was bought by American Machinery and Foundry (AMF), which produced leisure equipment such as snow skis, golf clubs, and bowling balls. AMF mismanaged the company to the point of near death, and sold it for $80 million in 1981 to a group of private investors, including Willie Davidson, a descendant of the original Davidson family. They rebuilt the company, placing a new emphasis on quality that had gotten away from them for decades. Customers returned. In 1987, Davidson and Friends took the company public.

That was the beginning of a spectacular ride. Shares of Harley at the end of 2007 were worth roughly 110 times what they traded for when the maker of the Fat Boy first went public…(p. 85-6)

What was responsible for this turnaround?
For the better part of two decades, Harley had the opportunity to do the right thing with its profits – sink them back into the business, making new and better products, and reaching out to loyal customers. In fact, the true glory years for Harley’s stock were those when management limited how fast the company made bikes. Rather than make all the hogs it could sell, Harley increased production at a rate of only %10 a year, lower than what the marketplace could bear. The ensuing scarcity of bikes raised the value of those machines that did make it to the market. For the better part of a decade, customers were willing to pay more than the manufacturer’s recommended price. (p. 86)
Something clicked when I read this, as I realized that Starbucks’ problem was not over-expansion, but a lopsided view on the meaning of growth.

Certainly more locations is one way to increase profit, but did it never occur to them to improve their product, similar to Harley Davidson? Starbucks' extra cash placed them in a position to improve their product, or at least to make it more efficiently. Or they could have experimented with real cappuccinos, which are generally thicker and have less foam, rather than switching to automated machines. Or they could have lowered the price of their products, which would have enabled them to compete more effectively with McDonalds and Dunkin Donuts. Instead, they’re stuck with too many stores which need to charge an arm and a leg for a cup of coffee in order to make a profit.

None of these strategies were guaranteed to work, but they get at a very basic aspect of economics: Differentiating between what you see and what you don’t see. Starbucks chose to err on the former by expanding everywhere, rather than the latter. However, the alternative strategies – which err on what you don’t see – were certainly viable, as seen in the success of Dunkin Donuts. In a very real sense, both were strategies behind growth. Yet do you hear liberals decry that Dunkin Donuts is taking over the world with their expansion of quality and lowering of price?

As Harley Davidson’s history shows, companies don’t just grow by getting physically bigger and taking up more space. As Hazlitt proclaimed in 1946, growth in areas that you don’t physically see right in front of you are often the most important types of growth.

The More Important

I want to end on this concept because I’m entranced by it.

Mankind necessarily begins with the concrete and what’s right in front of him, and over generations he forms laws of nature, which get at what Plato called underlying forms. Plato believed that the forms behind the manifestation of reality are inherently more important than physical objects, because the forms govern their existence. In other words, the law of gravitation is more important than the objects which are being gravitated, because the law allows us to understand the objects.

Hazlitt was saying something very similar, only in relation to economics: What we don’t see is often more important than what we see. We visually see Starbucks everywhere, but we don’t visually see the quality of coffee increasing. Hazlitt elaborated with an analogy to a broken shop window: If a shop’s window breaks, we see extra business go to the repair man. Judging just from what we see, broken windows are good because they produce business. What we don’t see, however, is more important. We don't see the foregone opportunities given up by shop owner. Perhaps he now has to make his goods more expensive, or he can’t expand his business. Economist John Maynard Keynes - whose influence has exceeded Marx in determining liberal economic policy - was notorious in his inability to grasp Hazlitt's law. He once famously suggested that we should bury money under ground, so that industries can form by digging holes to get them out.

I’m fond of intellectualizing issues, often to a fault (see this post and every other). For this reason, though, I’m often amazed at how intellectual liberals fail to grasp anything about the economy that's not in plain sight in front of their eyes; because Hazlitt’s law is the bare essence of intellectualization, by moving the discussion to the underlying principles, rather than just what’s out there in front of you. How can you be intellectual and fail to grasp that there’s more to the world than just what you see?

Nonetheless, liberals often chide at attempts to get at the underlying forms of the economy, such as Adam Smith's notion of the invisible hand, under the presumption that it's an oversimplified attempt to avoid reality. On the contrary, however, discussing physical economic things without reference their underlying economic form is like trying to move a rotating object without thinking about gravitational forces. Stated more succintly, its easy to change something's outward physical appearance, like an item's price, but its not easy to alter the form, like the information that a price conveys.

Of course, applied to the economy, this mistake is not specific to intellectual liberals. Many economists and politicians, in the tradition of Keynes, overemphasize consumer goods and end-products, which we see, over investments and savings, which we don't see. One instance of this was when former President Bush urged Americans to go shopping after 9/11 upon the assumption that this would stimulate the economy. Contrary to Bush's intention, buying random things when you don’t need them is pointless, and spending beyond your means is in fact harmful for the economy. When you buy a product that you need and can afford, you’re signaling to the manufacturer – along with anyone involved in its profit – that the product is valuable. You're telling them that you enjoy their product more than you would have enjoyed your extra money somewhere else. You're signaling them to make more of that product, or to keep doing what they were doing. Buying useless products that you can’t afford just adds noise to that signal, and it depletes from your savings. Savings again represent what you don’t see: They don’t just sit in a bank vault. They’re loaned to businesses or people, or are reinvested into the economy. That money is given a purpose, and in line with Hazlitt, that purpose is arguably more important than your consumption, particularly if you don’t need or want that consumption.

This misconception is magnified in the use of GDP – gross domestic product – to measure the macroeconomy. GDP is the total measure of exactly what you see: product. It doesn’t include what you don’t see, particularly savings and investment. When a window breaks, or another Starbucks opens, GDP increases, regardless of any depletion in savings; when a company like Harley Davidson focuses on making better motorcycles (and spends on R&D), GDP suffers.

Economist Mark Skousen, among a few others, hotly debates the usefulness of GDP. Using a statistic called gross output, he estimates that end-product consumer goods account for only a third of the economy. And this makes sense, because changes in the GDP usually lag behind changes in the stock market by a few months. It takes money to make money, and it also takes money in the right hands as well. That's why savings and investments are more important than consumption.

Right now most every company is in trouble, although to varying degrees. Starbucks used one strategy for expansion, though it certainly wasn’t the only strategy, and in hindsight it probably wasn’t the wisest. Harley Davidson management has recently turned south as well, as they’ve somehow managed to pile on a huge amount of debt while being aware of their shrinking baby-boomer customer base. But the important lesson is that these companies had options, as growth doesn’t always occur in areas that you see. Often the best things in life – love, joy, happiness – you can't see directly at all.

-KJ

_______________
Media (in order of appearance):

Photo: (1) Careful, 11/10/2006, by Carlos Aldana; (2) Fuel, 09/30/2006, by Nathan Makan; (3) 1907 Harley Davidson, photo by Rmhermen; (4) Harley Davidson Heritage Model 2004; (5) DUNKIN' DONUTS, 12/03/2006, by Paul Downey; (6) Concave modular origami : collection so far, 11/17/2008, by fdecomite; (7) Shattered Lens, 03/06/2006, by kandyjaxx; (8) Westfield White City, 11/25/2008, by Manuel.
Sphere: Related Content

Thursday, January 8, 2009

MW vs. Syms: There are more things to heaven and earth

It’s funny how you can think yourself into a hole. It’s especially common in analysis, which is the breakdown of a whole into its component parts. I recently did this when I was playing the addictive stock market stimulation, TMF Caps, where thousands of players rate stocks that they predict will out- or under-perform the S&P 500. You’re then awarded points based on whether your favored stocks out-perform the S&P and your un-favored ones under-perform the S&P. The next few paragraphs delve into 2 picks I made on Caps with the dual purpose of talking about the companies and then portraying my analytic rut. Then we’ll pop out and look at the nature of the rut itself.

One of my first picks was in favor of The Men’s Wearhouse (MW). MW sells discounted formal men's clothing and rents out tuxedos from hundreds of stores across the country. Here were my thoughts at the time:

Shopping is predominantly a female experience. Men’s sections at department stores are a joke. They’re at best a third the size of women’s sections and they’re always overpriced. My hunch is most men only find themselves in these stores because they’re brought in by their female counterparts. Which is fine, because expensive department stores can sell plenty of $80 ties to absently wandering men who are waiting for their women. But if a young man suddenly needs a bunch of formalwear - say, a whole new job’s worth of clothing – then he’s not going to fumble around at an overpriced department store.

Across the range of brands, prices for men’s formalwear increase exponentially. It’s not like cars, where there are plenty of discount, standard, and luxury items. Rather, the distribution of prices is heavily skewed with large price-jumps as you get just a bit fancier. On the one hand, you might expect this for any luxury good: You won’t find many cheap gold watches, because gold is expensive by nature. But at the same time, for many men, formalwear is an occupational necessity rather than a luxury.

MW is the biggest national company offering discounted men’s clothing, and this niche has a promising future. Consider 2 inescapable trends: Our economy continually shifts away from physical labor, and the baby-boomers – who are the wealthiest and most skilled workers – are retiring. The shift away from physical labor means that more occupations require men to wear suits; while retiring baby-boomers means that the remaining population will be younger and less wealthy, which makes them more likely to seek clothing discounts.

Based on this argument, I went ahead and placed my vote of confidence for MW on Caps. A few weeks and about 10 stock picks later I came across Syms (SYMS) which appealed to me for the same reason: Cheap men’s clothing. Syms is a much smaller company (with 30-some stores), and I’d frequented a local one, where the customer service was stellar. Their stores are physically bigger than MW’s, kind of like a Burlington Coat Factory but with suits instead of coats. And the store by me constantly has many ethnic minorities (both shopping and working there), which is a good sign because America is becoming less white.

But it didn’t take long for me to realize that Syms is a dreadful stock option. The stores make hardly any money and management has remained mostly in-family, to the point of concern. More disturbing were rumors about the company’s desire to go private. They delisted from the market for 4 months due to extra costs from new burdensome accounting laws, and during that time they expressed the desire to go totally private, but shareholder pressure persuaded them to reenlist. Yet just a few months after their return to the NASDAQ, they started touting the value of their real estate, and shareholders suspected that this was a ploy from the management to raise the stock's value just enough to buy it back and go private for good. Again, shareholder pressure prevented this. In response Syms’ PE ratio jumped to over 100, and it's suspiciously remained at that level for months. So in sum you have an extremely overvalued retail company, which is underhandedly more in the real-estate sector, and which is run by family management who’ve had to keep the company public against their will…and all of this is during a recession. The situation was so ugly I was compelled to vote against them on Caps (e.g., that they would under-perform the S&P).

Over the next few weeks I researched different companies and watched my score fluctuate. MW rose a bit, making it look like a nice recession-proof stock, and Syms dipped a bit, convincing me they had it in for them. However the problem was that whenever MW rose, Syms seemed to rise as well, and whenever MW fell, Syms fell as well. So when they both rose, I made points on MW but lost points on Syms; and when they both fell, I made points on Syms, but lost on MW.




Then one morning it hit me like a ton of bricks. Seriously it was a classic doh-moment, you know like an a-ha moment but for a stupid mistake: Both stocks were fluctuating in relation to general market expectations for the discounted men's clothing sector. Or perhaps more generally for the discounted clothing sector. Or just the discount retail companies. Of course. When investors were bullish on clothing retail – or even just on the retail market as a whole – both stocks went up, and when they were bearish on retail, both went down. It was to my disadvantage that both MW and Syms - in spite their differences, which appeared magnified in my analysis - were indeed such similar companies.

I’m admittedly unsure about my reasons for liking MW and disliking Syms, but I’m fairly confident about why, in combination, this was a losing proposition. Maybe it would've been obvious for more seasoned investors, but of course: It’s not a zero-sum game!

MW and Syms, although competitors in one sense, are allies in the general fight for opulence. This harks back to one of the best reasons for capitalism: It’s not a question of who gets what slice of the pie, it’s a question of the growth of the whole pie. Clearly there were larger forces at work than these 2 companies.

Sometimes it’s so easy to get bogged down in details that you forget about these overarching forces. The myth that life is a zero-sum game is commonly seen in economics, especially in arguments to redistribute wealth and in equilibrium models, but it extends beyond economics as well.

One analogous situation, which bugs the hell out of me, is the practice of awarding grades relative to students' standings in relation to each other, such that a class’ grades are based on percentiles (i.e., with a certain number of students receiving, A’s, B’s, C’s, etc). This practice automatically assumes that there is a limited amount of knowledge to be delved out among a group of students, and one student's insight into a concept is another's failure to grasp it. It further frees the professor from any responsibility to teach the subject matter, because all he’s responsible for doing is rating students relative to each other. Theoretically, the whole class can come out of a semester without any new knowledge and everything would look fine and dandy. In this system learning of true knowledge is mistaken for competition between students.

A natural extension of this system could be seen in Enron’s old semi-annual performance-review committees, where they ranked all the employees and laid off the bottom 15%. After years of doing this, the long-term result wasn’t better business but nasty cut-throat employees who tried to make their peers look bad, and who ultimately were part of taking down the company.

Competition, likewise in the free-market, occurs not so much between similar companies as it does against general market forces. Each company is fighting for the most efficient use of its necessary resources. It's telling, for instance, that Ford, GM, and Chrysler all announced that they were in trouble at the same time. Clearly these companies were hit harder from general market forces than from each other or from foreign companies.

I see people make this mistake as well in my day-to-day personal life. Like that guy with a nasty type-A personality who's always vying to get ahead or look better than his peers while he proclaims that it’s a dog-eat-dog world. Or on the highway the person who swerves right by you only to soon be stuck in traffic 3 cars ahead.

Or did you ever undertake an endeavor where no matter how hard you tried to succeed you still failed? And it’s like you come out of such an experience, and you’re running the same tape over and over your mind, trying to break it apart into smaller pieces, when perhaps it was really something bigger, or something out of view completely.

It seems like these days it’s easy to get into that sort of analytic rut in all sorts of contexts. Invariably the human mind has always been between 2 relative extremes - it’s small in relation to some things, large in relation to others – but modern science is constantly allowing us to zoom further in and to gaze further out, while more and more the hidden enigma for some things in life falls not so much at the edge of either extreme but in the ever-widening gap between them.

-KJ


_______________
Media (in order of appearance)

Photo: (1)Men's Wearhouse, 02/15/2008, by AnotherSunshine; (2) reflecting (upon) empty parking lot, 07/30/2007, by Lori Greig; (3) 曼哈頓最讚的折扣店, 02/25/2007, by Tommy Ian; (4) Hemming and Hawwing, 12/01/2007, by Andy I.; (5) Times Square, 06/14/2007, by barabeke; (6) Project365 - 250, 09/09/2007, by Mike Nielson; (7) N2008-06-19_06_cesta-do-prahy, 06/25/2008, by Ma a Ra.

Video: (1) Music video of the song "Do you Realize??" by The Flaming Lips from their 2002 album Yoshimi Battles the Pink Robots.

______________
Upcoming ideas:

  • Progress isn't linear
  • Intel vs. AMD, Apple
  • Advances in tech outstripping modes of thinking, ideas
Sphere: Related Content
 
Add to Technorati Favorites Add to Technorati Favorites